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This article examines retail market regulatory reforms currently underway, as part of the
implementation of a Twin Peaks regulatory model in South Africa. A brief account is provided
of the history of these reforms, followed by an analysis of the normative goals put in place for
a new market conduct and consumer protection regime; and the developmental needs that
inform those goals. Thereafter the article explores the inter-relationship between the existing
credit regulator and the soon to be established Financial Sector Conduct Authority. An
analysis is then provided of accountability mechanisms, as well as failures exhibited by those
mechanisms in the UK and Australia. Finally an argument is made for a ‘regulator for the
regulators’, in order to address past regulatory failures.

A. Introduction

number of regulators of financial products,
services, and entities, each with its own

The ‘Twin Peaks’ 1 model of financial

limited

system regulation was first proposed by

confused as to whom to approach for

Michael Taylor in 1995. 2 Taylor’s idea

support. Consumers were confronted by a

began as an attempt to address, principally,

bevvy of regulators, whose acronyms

two problems evident in the United

taken together Taylor described as an

Kingdom: first, that the large and disparate

‘alphabet soup’.3 To this Taylor proposed a
dedicated,

jurisdiction,

whole-of

left

consumers

financial

system

regulator – a one-stop shop – the purpose

B. Twin Peaks with normative

of which would be to protect consumers,

goals

and deter market misconduct.4 The second
problem Taylor identified and which he

South

asserted his model could address, was that

commenced in 2011 with the publication

5

Africa’s

trek

to

twin

peaks

of a blurring of the boundaries between

by the South African National Treasury of

types of financial entities: banks were

a policy document 13 which provided an

combining with insurers, merchant banks

overview of the financial sector, and put

were combining with securities traders –

forward overarching principles to guide

causing gaps to appear in regulatory

analysis of whether, and to what extent,

coverage.

6

This second regulator would

there was a need for regulatory reform.

have a consolidated group-level view of all

The process’ commencement coincided

entities under its jurisdiction, with the

with the aftermath of the sub-prime

authority to create and enforce regulations

disaster in the United States, and the

aimed at safeguarding financial system

ensuing GFC 14 , and this may be one

stability.7

explanation as to why the Cabinet, on
8

First adopted in Australia in 1997,
and

subsequently

Kingdoms

of

Belgium,

New

followed

the

in

The

specified that one of the guiding principles

Netherlands

and

to a new regulatory regime should be that

Zealand,

the

United

Kingdom (UK), and now South Africa,

9

which is poised to impose a ‘Twin Peaks’
financial

quality

of

sufficiently

supervision

intense,

must

intrusive

effective.15 To that was added:

South African reforms shadow those of the

sufficiently strong to complement

1987

prudential

Commission,

which

established the ‘Financial Rand’ and the
dual exchange rate;

10

they are more

significant than those of the 1993 Melamet
Commission 11 and, some would argue,
more significant than any other changes to
the management of the financial system
since South Africa left the gold-standard in
1932.

12

be
and

Market conduct oversight must be

Kock

architecture.

the

The

de

regulatory

approving the adoption of Twin Peaks,

regulation,

particularly in the banking sector.
Market

conduct

oversight

is

critical for the financial sector,
and

complements

prudential

oversight.16

This is a theme that also appears frequently
in the Draft Market Conduct Policy
document

17

issued as an adjunct to

National Treasury’s 2011 document that, if

there is an alleged breach. 20 Carmichael

need be, supervision must be intrusive.

states that this new approach is more
21

… ordinary, generic customer

resource intensive.

protection laws do not go far

correct, then that has crucial implications

enough ... potential for economic

for South Africa, a developing country

disruption and consumer hardship

with needs across society that are greater

… sector requires much higher

than the resources available.22

regulatory standards relative to
other

sectors

… tailored

These social benefit goals laid the

to

respond to market conduct risks.
... A dedicated regulator for
market conduct, the FSCA, will

If Carmichael is

basis for a dispensation which is, at least in
terms of its stated aims, strongly normative
– an aspect to which this article will return.

institutions

The process envisages two pieces

more intensely and intrusively …

of legislation, the first of which, the

take steps to end unfair or

Financial Sector Regulation Act23 (FSRA),

harmful practises as they emerge,

was promulgated in August 2017. In so

supervise

financial

18

...

This

doing, South Africa becomes the first
comports

current

developing24 nation to adopt this model.25

thinking developed post-GFC. Carmichael,

Other countries that have signalled an

Foundation Chair of Australia’s prudential

interest in adopting Twin Peaks include

regulator and a member of the Wallis

South Korea,

Commission of Inquiry whose findings led

Kenya,29 and China.30 This forms part of a

to the establishment of Twin Peaks in

global trend, starting in 1998, in which 80

Australia states that prior to the GFC,

per cent of OECD members have reformed

conduct regulations were reactive not

their

proactive,

architecture

and

focused

with

on

pursuing

26

domestic
31

Canada,

27

financial
-

and

Nigeria,

28

regulatory

particularly

in

19

breaches of the law. He states that with a

countries with sectoral or institutional

shift post-GFC from product disclosure to

models. 32 It is for these reasons that the

product suitability, conduct regulators have

South African reforms are noteworthy: as

had to become more preventative in their

mentioned, it is the first developing

approach to regulatory enforcement; and

country and latest adopter of Twin Peaks,

this is reflected in new methodologies, for

and as such may be expected to evidence

example a greater degree of onsite

latest thinking; lessons learned in South

inspections as opposed to investigations,

Africa will be of relevance wherever Twin

where the latter typically takes place when

Peaks is adopted next, but also of

relevance wherever Twin Peaks is already

percentage of South Africa’s population

de lege. If the conventional wisdom is

that has limited access to finance, limited

correct, by ascribing much of Australia’s

education, limited ownership of assets, and

success during the global financial crisis

suffers under a substantial disparity of

(GFC) to the deployment of Twin Peaks,33

wealth.

then lessons learned in South Africa will

With a population of 55 million,35

have a potentially wider impact, beyond

those regarded as economically-active, and

the specificities of Twin Peaks, by

between the ages of 15 and 64 number

providing lessons for the avoidance of

approximately 40 million.36 One quarter of

financial crises generally. To that end,

that number – what should be The

success in South Africa may act as an

Republic’s most economically productive

exemplar of what solutions regulatory

citizens – are unemployed.37 While South

architectural design can offer to the

Africa

overarching project: the avoidance of

improvements to its education system

financial crises.

since the advent of democracy in 1994,

has

made

commendable

The Australian banking system

there are still in excess of two and a half

was

a

million adults who are illiterate.38 Between

number of other countries and

2010 and 2015, of the 143 countries that

weathered the Global Financial

provided

more

sheltered

than

Crisis relatively well. This was in

the

system

on

a

well

Gini

Using a Palma ratio,40 out of 143 countries
that reported, South Africa was 143rd. 41

but also due to a material

developed

Africa’s

disparity, placed South Africa at 143. 39

performing domestic economy,

contribution

South

coefficient, a measurement for wealth

part due to relative concentration
of

data,

a

well-

Using a quintile ratio, out of 46 countries

regulatory

and

reporting, South Africa was ranked 45th.42

from

supervisory structure.34

Together these factors are instrumental in

As mentioned previously, the South

creating low levels of financial inclusion in

African reforms are noteworthy for another

South Africa. Combined with poor levels

reason: they are grounded in a clearly

of financial literacy (see Fig. 1), there exist

normative approach, which specifically

opportunities for unscrupulous financial

mentions the developmental priorities of

service providers, and especially lenders,

the

and

to take advantage of the large number of

the

unsophisticated financial consumers in

large

South Africa. Such an outcome would, in

South

doubtless
community;

African
the
in

government,

expectations
particular,

of
the

turn, impede successful financial inclusion,

disasters of all in South Africa.

potentially

Extreme

cause

disproportionate

detriment to the most vulnerable in
society,

43

deter

savings,

inhibit

intermediation, result in social unrest
potentially causing death, 44 and in the
worst scenario a financial crisis (see
below). It is no wonder, then, that the

over-indebtedness

…

helped precipitate the Marikana
massacre on August 16 [2012].
Miners … were … seduced … into
accessing

far

too

much

45

microcredit.

… [F]orced into spending more
on interest payments ... no matter

South African authorities have placed such

how hard they tried, … not prise

emphasis not just on consumer protection

themselves

and good market conduct, but further, by

microcredit in advance of payday

articulating goals that strongly emphasise

... The miners’ desperation and

societal good, with particular emphasis on

anger

the poor.

refused to back down, and a

…

[W]e

witnessed
appalling

have
one

perhaps
of

the

was

away

from

palpable,

…

Lonmin

just

massacre ensued [when South

most

African Police Services members

microcredit-related

shot striking miners].46

Figure 1.47

The subprime lesson
Analyses of the lessons to be learned from
the GFC often focus on systemic stability

issues cum bank soundness principles and

losses. It has defrauded more

regulations, at the expense of the need to

people, at a greater cost, than any

provide analysis of what is adequate

entity in history ... The financial

consumer protection and the prevention of

media treats Bank of America as
if it were a legitimate bank rather

market misconduct. But this overlooks the

than a “vector” spreading the

fact that the GFC was market misconduct

mortgage

and consumer abuse write large. As Wray

fraud

epidemic

throughout much of the Western

states:

world.49

… many billions of dollars of
fraudulent

…

loans
48

Countrywide[

by

]…

sold

Fannie

and

fraudulently

to

Freddie

through

false

representations and warranties.

And

even

countless

more

troubling

instances

of

than
fraud

the
and

misconduct that gave rise to the subprime
crisis – troubling enough as those were –
were the nasty, predatory, and at times

… 97% of the Countrywide loans

racist 50 undertones of so many of those

reviewed by Ambac … had false

malpractices. It is not surprising, therefore,

reps and warranties. Countrywide

that

also

cognoscente

of

foreclosure fraud. … [E]xamined

developmental

needs

by a truly independent body has

aspirations, and aware that the poor and ill-

engaged

in

widespread

found widespread fraud — in loan
origination,

loan

sales,

appraisals, and foreclosures. …
[O]ne financially sophisticated
entity

after

another

found

widespread fraud by Countrywide
in

the

entire

gamut

of

its

the

South

African
the
and

authorities,
country’s
society’s

educated, who constitute the majority of
the population, suffer disproportionate
harm in poorly regulated markets; that
where such harmful practices remain
unchallenged, systemic threats to the entire
financial system may result.

operations, the administration,
the industry… Countrywide made
hundreds

of

thousands

of

The 2014 National Treasury Draft

fraudulent loans … It fraudulently

Market Conduct Policy

foreclosed on large numbers of

Released as a Discussion Document, the

loans. It victimized hundreds of
thousands of people and hundreds
of financial institutions, causing
hundreds of billions of dollars of

Draft Market Conduct Policy makes clear
the following view (albeit not in so many
words):

…

constantly

remind

market

ensure that one peak does not dominate the

participants that finance only

other.

exists

accommodates an ideational principle: that

to

serve

the

broader

community and the economy.51

respect

protection

Twin

and

paragraph that consumers are inadequately
protected in South Africa;

52

that they fall

prey to reckless lending ‘paired with
disgraceful (and illegal) debt-collection
practices’; that poor market conduct
consumers

exacerbates

problems of low domestic savings and

prudential

that the ensuing policy disagreements and
conflicting situational responses should be
regarded

as

a

natural

phenomenon,

embraced, and settled through discussions
convened at an over-arching council,
underpinned

by

constant

and

Market conduct regulation aims
to

these and other factors impede South

customers by responding to these

Africa progressing towards greater levels

risks, and is a key pillar of the

of financial inclusion.53 As such the Report

Twin

tacitly acknowledges that the management

implemented in South Africa.56

of the financial system must be focused, at
least in part, on redressing the injustices

better

protect

Peaks

financial

system

being

This principle is borne out in the
Treasury’s clear view that:

and in particular the income inequality that

Protecting

was the result of 46 years of Apartheid.

ensuring they are treated fairly by
financial

… financial inclusion [is defined]

customers

institutions

and

is

the

essence of market conduct policy

as the broadening and deepening

and law.57

of the access to, usage of, and
of

close

communication and cooperation.55

high levels of over indebtedness; and that

quality

Peaks

regulation should be regarded as equal, and

The Report states in its first

to

that

consumer

Not the other way round.

prejudicial

In

financial

products/services to all adults
particularly

the

C. Three Peaks?

marginalised

groups such as the un-served and
under-served.54

This confident exposition of what the

One of the advantages of the Twin
Peaks

model

is

its

separation

consumer protection peak should be

of

focused upon, without the barest mention

prudential/system stability oversight from

of systemic stability issues is, ideationally

that of market conduct and consumer

at least, the essence of where consumer

protection, with particular care taken to

protection should be located: an end in

and must be approved by ASIC from time

itself. How successful this will be in

to time to remain functioning, 64 whereas

practice remains to be seen. However,

the NCR does not exist at the pleasure of

there is evidence to date that the South

the FSCA, is a national government

African

that

agency, created by statute, 65 with powers

consumer protection is its own very

and prerogatives at law. The Australian

distinct territory, and one that needs to be

Ombud may have regard to equity and the

defended from incursion. 58 In defence of

law as laid down in the Code, but despite

its realm the proposed consumer protection

that flexibility, it may be argued that the

peak,

Conduct

South African arrangement is preferable,

Authority (FSCA), will be buttressed by an

because the legislation that it is built

already existing consumer credit protection

around is more consumer centric than

regime:

Australian’s. 66 Moreover, the role of the

authorities

the

a

Regulator

understand

Financial

dedicated
(NCR),

59

Sector

National
created

National Credit Act of 2005,
complimented

by

a

National

Credit
by

the

South African NCR is considerably more

60

and

comprehensive: it licenses extenders of

Credit

credit; its powers are not limited to

Tribunal.61

mediation,

but

extend

to

litigation,

It is not unusual to find a separation

including litigation where the complainant

between the protection of consumers of

is the NCR, and not an individual

credit and those of consumers of other

consumer; is imbued with social upliftment

financial products and services. Such a

and

bifurcation exists in Australia as well, in

required to research trends in credit

the form of the Australian Securities and

extension and make those findings known;

Investments Commission (ASIC) – the

is required to contribute to financial

agency with general responsibility for

literacy education; is expected to make a

consumer protection in the financial

contribution to policy, including legislative

62

industry - and the National Credit Code,

reform proposals; regulates and adjudicates

and

Investments

in certain administrative manners; and

the

Credit

and

financial

Ombudsman.63 However the South African

hands

regime is distinct from Australia’s in a

compliance.67

number of crucial respects, and it is the

down

inclusion

findings

priorities;

in

respect

is

of

As a result, and because the South

degree of difference that is potentially

African legislation was

significant: the Australian Ombud is

bespoke

created pursuant to powers vested in ASIC,

regulating, licensing, educating, enforcing

provisions

for

drafted

with

monitoring,

and at times punishing, within one

inadequately

wide-spread,

statutorily empowered agency, it provides

versus

a regime in which the South African credit

interventions

regulator is a far more sophisticated and

consumers whose plight, whilst

entrenched agency than the equivalent

not wide-spread, is nonetheless

arrangement in Australia. The question

urgent for them;

(micro-prudential)
on

behalf

of

then arises as to whether two regulators,

ii) Credit, a good servant but a

both with an interest in, and powers over,

bad master: credit by its nature

what is essentially the same territory, was

can

the best solution? Or whether it would

extended recklessly, excessive

have been better to have housed these

credit can trap borrowers in an

functions within the FSCA? 68 The simple

inescapable

answer is that the current arrangement is a

indebtedness and poverty.

product of history: the National Credit

Notwithstanding

69

be

seductive.

When

cycle

of
72

the

Regulator was created in 2005, whereas

acknowledgement

the FSCA was not contemplated until

dangers improperly regulated

2011. 70 That said, there are arguments to

credit

be made in support of the South African

persistent problem of over-

arrangement:

indebtedness

can

of

pose,

and

among

the

the

South

i) The regulator’s roles: if the

African households, and despite

Australian experience proves

the work of the NCR since its

instructive,71 then the consumer

establishment,

protection peak (FSCA) will

persists: unsecured loans in

take a macro-prudential view,

South Africa have become the

while the NCR will continue to

biggest growth market for the

fulfil a micro-prudential role.

four

major
73

the

South

African

This plugs a gap between

banks.

regulator’s interventions that

associated

are

therefore, on-going and severe.

in

interests

the

country’s

best

(macro-prudential),

The

problem

with

problems
credit

amount of credit granted to

but where the regulator declines

consumers

to act, even in the best interests

substantially from R1.1 trillion in

of

individual

consumers

because their particular plight is

has

increased

2007 to R1.5 trillion in 2014.
There were 21.7 million credit

are,

active consumers and out of these,

economically dispossessed as

9.6 million (44.2%) had impaired

well. Credit extension is an

records. This increase has also

important stage in the path to

led to an evolution of the problem

financial

of household over-indebtedness.

better

income in South Africa is still

serve

advantage

is

the

goal

may

exceed

actually down from its early

disadvantage

created

peaks: Q4 2008 — 81.9% and this

bifurcation

of

fell to 74.3% in Q4 2013. This is

protection regulators;

an indication that a large portion

v) Economies

of household incomes still goes to
servicing debt.

classified

iii) South Africa’s demographics:

educated,
indebted,

76

a

consumer

scale:

the

75

as

sufficiently

poor.

77

If

wide-spread,

unscrupulous credit extension

over-

that preys upon the vulnerable

ill-

in society has, therefore, the

illiterate

capacity to be a systemic threat;

financially
or

of

by

the

ill-

already

educated

of

majority of South Africans are

74

the combination of poor,

a

financial inclusion, then that

high, even though the overall
indebtedness

If

dedicated credit regulator can

Household debt to disposable

household

inclusion.

consumers, whose needs are not

Consumer

currently being met, results in a

can, and must, serve a role not

portion of the population who

only in protecting individuals

are both vulnerable and in need

from excessive risk, but also in

of a path to greater financial

protecting markets from systemic

inclusion. In combination with

risk. Economic studies indicate it

the nature and effects of credit,

is not merely high rates of

the need for protection aimed at
vulnerable consumers in their
consumption of credit becomes
more obvious;

financial

protection

defaults on consumer loans, but
highly correlated defaults that
create risks for lenders and
investors

in

asset-backed

78

securities.

iv) South Africa’s history: South

vi) Focus: a dedicated regulator

Africans of colour were not

with oversight over smaller

only politically disenfranchised

territory – credit – may be able

by

to bring more focus to the task,

Apartheid,

they

were

develop a greater degree of

bundled with other types of accounts, both

expertise

specific

regulation

of

to

the

regulators would be involved. Without

credit,

and

close coordination this could lead to

develop a corporate culture
more suited to its task (for

confusion and contradiction.
To that end the Financial Sector
Regulation

frontline

assist

provisions for the establishment and

members of the public), than

maintenance of the relationship between

would a generalist consumer

the regulators,80 including membership the

protection peak that operates

Financial Stability Oversight Committee.81

also with a credit regulatory

The Act specifically designates the NCR

role.

as a ‘financial sector regulator’ in the same

capacity

to

Act

79

example, by developing its

includes

specific

So, while Twin Peaks jurisdictions

definition in which it designates the FSCA

such as Australia have carved out a

and the prudential authority as financial

separate set of structures for dealing with

sector regulators. 82 The Act quarantines

problems associated with the extension of

financial

credit, the South African arrangement is,

provision of credit83 to the National Credit

by comparison, both more sophisticated

Act, 84 save for specific provisions in the

and complex. The degree of difference

FSRA set aside for the jurisdiction of the

between the two dedicated credit regimes

FSCA.85

is sufficient to present the South African
Twin

the

Over and above these legislative

challenges: the NCR is a fully-fledged

communication, an essential mechanism

agency, and relationships with the two

by which the performance of the South

peaks will have to be managed with the

African peaks will be measured will rest

same care, deference and cooperative spirit

upon regulator accountability. In respect of

with which the relationship between the

market conduct, that accountability may be

two peaks will have to be managed.

measured against some or all of the

Consequently, success will depend upon

normative standards expressed in the

the degree to which these two entities – the

legislation,

the

NCR

with

involve

provisions that require cooperation and

and

model

that

additional

FSCA

Peaks

products

–

coordinate,

communicate and cooperate. In particular,
there are areas where the NCA and the
FSCA will overlap: where credit is

policy

government policy.86

documents

and

D. Regulator Accountability

It appears intuitive that accountability be
regarded as an indispensible component of
effective government, and this extends to
regulator efficacy. 87 In Australia formal
accountability takes the form of annual
reports

88

and Parliamentary oversight.

89

contributed

to

the

supervisory

neglect

appalling
of

asset

quality. The FSA’s attempts to
raise concerns on these other
fronts from late 2007 onwards
proved to be a case of too little,
too late

96

… The regulatory

approach encouraged a focus on
box-ticking which detracted from

There exists also the possibility of

consideration of the fundamental

oversight by independent bodies, and of

issues with the potential to bring

course by the public through the media.90

the

bank

down.

The

FSA’s

A similar regime will exist in South

approach also encouraged the

Africa, where the prudential regulator will

Board of HBOS to believe that

be required to submit annual reports to the
National Assembly.91 The FSCA must also
produce and submit annual reports via the
Auditor General.92 All the regulators of the

they could treat the regulator as a
source of interference to be
pushed back, rather than an
independent source of guidance
and,

latterly,

a

necessary

financial system plus the Reserve Bank are

constraint upon the company’s

members

mistaken courses of action.97

of

the

Financial

Stability

Oversight Committee, which includes an
accountability regime,

93

In his foreword to the FSA report

as well as the

on the ruinous RBS-ABN Amro takeover,

Financial System Council of Regulators,

Lord Turner, FSA Chairman, stated that

which provides for extensive government

RBS had procured two lever-arch folders

oversight.

94

This comports with what

Taylor envisaged for the model through
either

Ministerial

oversight.

or

Parliamentary

95

and a CD 98 as the sum total of their due
diligence, to which Hosking responded:
His suggestion is clear: if only
RBS

had

garnered

more

and

information, if only there had

Ministerial oversight and the production of

been more lever-arch files... This

annual reports failed dismally in the UK

is the philosophy of the deluded

That

said,

Parliamentary

prior to the GFC.
… the FSA was not so much the
dog that did not bark as a dog
barking up the wrong tree. …

bureaucrat. If only there had been
more reports, more meetings; if
only more boxes had been ticked,
more forms filled in. On the

Origin of Species, the Bible and

Inquiry into the conduct of Australia’s

the

banks, and the oversight conducted by the

collected

works

of

Shakespeare could be contained

regulators.105

in two lever-arch folders and a

As Barth et al assert, regulators

CD. How much more information

prior

does Lord Turner think RBS

to

the

GFC

abrogated

their

responsibilities, and giving them more

needed? … It’s not volume of

regulatory power will not address this

information that matters. It’s

problem.106

quality.99

Hosking points out that in respect
of the claim that in the three and a half
years prior to RBS’s collapse, the FSA met

E. A regulator for the regulators

with RBS 511 times:100
It’s typical that there is someone

Unfortunately, in the wake of the

to count them, but no one to

crisis, we now seem to be lurching

explain what on earth went on in

from one simplistic, unqualified

them ... would [it] have been

ideology—that private markets

better had there been a thousand?

will

The FSA tells us that 0.5 of an

interests—to an equally flawed, if

FSA manager and 4.5 team

not more perilous, ideology—that

members were assigned to RBS as

the Guardians will always act in

it was mounting the bid. 101 The

society’s interests, so let’s give

clipboard-hugging precision of

them more power to do so.107

those decimals speaks volumes …

Successful and lasting reform

The report is a blizzard of

requires addressing a core cause

acronyms and bogus science: RBS

of the systemic malfunctioning of

was scored as a “medium high

financial

minus” 102 risk, whatever that is

governance of the Guardians of

…103

Finance.108

Similarly

in

Australia

the

look

after

society’s

systems—poor

It is interesting to note, therefore, that

performance of the regulators has been

Australia’s

Financial

patchy at times, and deeply inadequate at

recommended

others.104 The litany of scandals that have

regulators’ in the form of a Financial

infected Australia’s banking, insurance,

Regulator Assessment Board (FRAB), 109

and financial advice industries has led to

which would replace the Financial Sector

consistent calls for a Royal Commission of

Advisory Council (FSAC), and would

a

System

‘regulator

Inquiry
for

the

undertake ex post reviews of regulator
accountability

110

by ‘assess[ing] how

regulators have used the powers and
discretions available to them.’
have

been

expected,

the

111

culture within the entities which it would
oversee, and that would include identifying
instances of regulatory capture generally.

As may

… according to considerable

Australian

evidence from around the world,
financial

regulators pushed back against this idea.112

is

systematically biased in favor of

Such a Board could be expected

the financial services industry and

not only to assess and evaluate regulatory

against

action and outcomes, but to delve into

the

interests

of

the

broader public.114

regulatory culture as well. As McConnell
states:

regulation

At the very least such a board
would act as a sober second thought on

In behavioural economics, such
“concurrence” across a group is
called groupthink. … Groupthink
… is unhealthy because, not only
do people start to think alike, it is

issues that may have been overlooked by
the regulator, and which may potentially
constitute
system.

a

The

only a short step to believing

threat

to

the

financial

115

Australian

proposal

has

people who are singing a different

precedent in the UK, which established a

tune should be excluded and

Financial Policy Committee (FPC),

thrown out of the chorus. Dissent

whose purpose is to look for the roots of

can be destructive, but the role of

the next crisis.

the Devil’s Advocate is wellunderstood

to

be

valuable,

… [the FRAB would comprise of]
knowledgeable experts, crucially

It is charged with

identifying, monitoring, and taking action
to reduce systemic risks.

drawing out important questions
people would rather not answer.

117

116

Similarly, and in response to
regulator’s failures prior to the GFC, Barth
et al put forward a similar proposal for an

not tied to regulators, with a

expert

panel

diverse membership that would

‘Senitnel’.118

of

oversight,

called

a

“act as a safeguard against the

Unfortunately the proposal for a

FRAB being unduly influenced by

Financial Regulator Assessment Board

the views of one particular group

was

or industry sector”.

government. 119 Nonetheless, the proposal

113

An oversight board would be less
likely to be captured by the prevailing

rejected

by

the

Australian

has advantages which may be of benefit to

the South African financial regulatory

the failures in the UK did not take place

landscape.

under a Twin Peaks regime, but took place
prior to the introduction of Twin Peaks, the
lesson remains the same: annual reports,

F. Conclusion

and

Parliamentary

and

Ministerial

oversight may prove inadequate to the
South Africa is well-advanced in its trek

task. A system designed to impose ‘double

towards Twin Peaks. The next major

redundancy’, or a fail-safe, may prove to

hurdle

be

will

be

the

creation

and

the

solution.
of

In

light

large-scale

of

the

implementation of a new market conduct

consequences

market

and consumer protection peak. It is no

misconduct cum financial crises, this

doubt gratifying for the majority of South

article argues that despite the costs and

Africans to know that this new regime will

effort involved in establishing a ‘regulator

be, ideationally at least, firmly rooted in

for the regulators’, such a proposal should

normative principles aimed at addressing

be seriously considered for addition to the

the urgent developmental needs of The

South African reforms.

Republic.
One particular aspect that will
require attention, and no doubt generate
analysis, is the relationship between the
two official peaks –

the prudential

regulator and the FSCA – and what may be
regarded as the third peak, the NCR.
But more important still will be the
efficacy of the regulators in discharging
their obligations. 120 That will, to a large
degree, depend upon the depth and extent
to which regulators are held accountable.
Methodologies
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effect accountability – via Parliamentary
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notable failures, both in times of crisis (as
was the case in the UK), and in times of
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